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Abstract
Credit market imperfections can prevent the poor from making
pro￿table investments. Under asymmetric information observable fea-
tures, such as wealth and collateral, play an important role in deter-
mining who gets credit, in violation of the Equality of Opportunity
principle. We de￿ne equality of opportunity as the equal possibility
of getting credit for a given aversion to e⁄ort. We ￿rst establish that,
due to larger cross subsidization in high collateral classes of borrow-
ers, richer individuals are more likely to get credit for a given aversion
to e⁄ort. Our second result is that Inequality of Opportunity is as-
sociated with an ine¢ cient allocation of resources among classes of
borrowers. The marginal borrower in classes that post more collateral
exerts less e⁄ort in equilibrium (and therefore produces lower aggre-
gate surplus) than the marginal borrower in lower collateral classes.
This suggests that public credit policies should be targeted at poorer
classes of would be borrowers both for equity and e¢ ciency reasons,
which rarely occurs in practice.
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11 Introduction
Credit market imperfections can prevent the poor from making pro￿table
investments. Asymmetric information is crucial to understand the role of
individual wealth in relation to credit availability. Lack of collateral may ob-
viously represent a barrier. Under full information each project is funded only
upon the evaluation of the borrowers￿e⁄ort. Under asymmetric information
instead observable features such as wealth and collateral play an important
role in determining who gets credit. Collateral is important also because it
in￿ uences the willingness of individuals to supply e⁄ort by itself and also
through lower interest rates. We focus on the relation between equality of
opportunity and credit market to determine if under these circumstances the
possibility of getting credit is determined by collateral.
The seminal contribution on the e⁄ect of asymmetric information in the
credit market is due to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) who demonstrate that the
credit market may not clear due to the possible existence of an interest rate
above which default rises so much that the pro￿tability of the banks starts
to decrease.
Bester (1985) however shows that credit rationing is not general at all,
based on an enriched model. Di⁄erent amounts of collateral could be devised
to determine separating equilibria among di⁄erent classes of borrowers, solv-
ing the asymmetric information problems. Moreover, Riley (1987) underlines
that credit rationing will occur only for some classes of borrowers determined
by their lowest wealth level. An increase in the number of (observable) social
types progressively reduces the rationing phenomenon and only in the limit
redlining may appear.
A di⁄erent framework proposed by De Meza and Webb (1987) is charac-
terized not only by the absence of rationing but also by excessive lending.
They show that competitive equilibria can arise where some borrowers re-
alize projects whose social bene￿ts do not compensate their social costs.
Cross-subsidization among safe and risky borrowers occurs due to asymmet-
ric information. An increase in the amount of collateral delivers a reduction
in cross-subsidies. On the same perspective, De Meza and Webb (1999)
study how credit-market requirements may exclude low-wealth individuals,
irrespective of the exogenous quality of their projects.
Following such line of analysis, we construct a model in which we analyze
how a competitive equilibrium performs in terms of equality of opportunity.
In particular our model is characterized by heterogeneity in the intrinsic fea-
2tures of the investor, notably her aversion to e⁄ort, asymmetric information
and standard moral hazard. Entrepreneurs di⁄er also for observable wealth,
which they post entirely as collateral. As in De Meza and Webb (1987, 1999)
asymmetric information delivers overinvestment and cross subsidization for
investor in each wealth class. However, at high levels of e⁄ort aversion richer
individuals get credit while poorer ones do not. This is due to several reasons:
on one side collateral mitigates the moral hazard problem and delivers more
e⁄ort spent for the same level of e⁄ort aversion. Moreover richer individuals
are charged lower interest rate which in turn has the same e⁄ect. Finally,
and more importantly, cross subsidization occurs to a larger extent in richer
borrowers￿classes. For all these reasons we ￿nd that the equality of opportu-
nity principle, de￿ned in this context as the equal possibility of getting credit
given one individual￿ s personal features (e.g. her e⁄ort aversion) is violated.
Poorer individuals have far less chance to participate in the credit market.
Our next line of inquiry concerns the relative e¢ ciency of lending to
di⁄erent classes of borrowers. To this aim we investigate whether, in the
resulting equilibrium, rich investors participating actually exert more or less
e⁄ort. From what we know poorer individuals exert less e⁄ort, for any given
e⁄ort aversion, due to the incentive e⁄ect of collateral. However richer indi-
viduals participate also for lower level of e⁄ort aversion, due to larger cross
subsidization in their class. We show that for the marginal individuals par-
ticipating in the credit market in di⁄erent classes of wealth, e⁄ort spent is
inversely correlated with wealth. This result suggests that a public policy
that transfers resources and credit from rich to poor people at the margin
increases output.
In the next section, after setting up our model we discuss the trade-o⁄be-
tween collateral, repayment and e⁄ort in the benchmark case of self-￿nanced
project. Thereafter, focusing on the behavior of the marginal borrower, we
observe how cross subsidization takes place in each borrower￿ s class. The
analysis goes on in section 3 demonstrating the violation of the equality of
opportunity principle through the correlation between repayment and e⁄ort
aversion. Section 4 is devoted to test the incentive e⁄ect evaluating the di⁄er-
ential ine¢ ciency of the marginal borrowers in di⁄erent wealth classes due to




Consider a project with capital requirement K. It yields a ￿xed gross return
Y with probability p(e) or zero revenue with probability 1 ￿ p(e), where
e is the amount of e⁄ort. Returns to e⁄ort are positive and diminishing
as usual, i.e. p0(e) > 0 and p00(e) < 0. In more general terms, we can
express the distribution of returns F(e) in terms of the random probability
of success p(e), such that greater e⁄ort re￿ ects a continuous distribution of
returns which stochastically dominates any distribution with lower e⁄ort.
Each borrower must raise an outside ￿nance.
2.2 The Borrowers
We consider an economy with a ￿nite number of would be borrowers each
endowed with a project described above. Agents are risk-neutral and are
characterized by di⁄erent levels of e⁄ort aversion, which is the responsibility
variable in the opportunity egalitarian context. The e⁄ort cost for a borrower
i, with e⁄ort aversion ￿s is ￿se. At the same time, each agent belongs to a
certain class of wealth, j, that they put up entirely as collateral cj
1, where
cj < K 8j. The borrower￿ s aversion to e⁄ort and her actual e⁄ort choice are
assumed to be private information and are independently distributed from
cj, while we will not make any explicit assumption about the distribution of
the e⁄ort aversion parameter ￿s . Let Xj = (1+rj)K be the total repayment
where rj is the interest rate required by the bank for class of observable
collateral. The borrowers￿expected utility when the project is funded is
given by:
Ui = p(e)(Y ￿ Xj) ￿ (1 ￿ p(e))cj ￿ ￿se (1)
1They cannot choose the preferable amount of wealth to realize their project. Therefore,
in this analysis wealth and collateral assume the same meaning.
42.3 The lenders
The lenders do not know the e⁄ort characteristics of borrowers. They know
the population distribution of e⁄ort aversion, whatever it is, observe the
wealth of each borrower, which they post as collateral, and therefore charge
di⁄erent interest rates to di⁄erent classes of borrowers according to their
wealth. We assume zero risk-free interest rate. For a single borrower, the
representative bank￿ s pro￿t in a competitive market is:
￿ = p(e)Xj + (1 ￿ p(e))cj ￿ K = 0 (2)
2.4 First best
It can be interesting to note that if individual￿ s investment is realized entirely
as self-￿nanced project, the e⁄ort level will be chosen with:
maxe p(e)Y ￿ ￿se ￿ K (3)







This represents our ￿rst-best level of e⁄ort (benchmark case).
2.5 Comparative statics
Now we analyze the possibility to receive a loan from a bank in order to invest
in the same project. In a context of hidden action, we assume that is not
veri￿able by the banks, hence it is not contractible. Moreover, there is limited
liability, i.e., if projects returns are less than the repayment obligations, the
borrowers bear no responsibility to pay out of pocket. The e⁄ort choice of a
borrower follows from:
5maxe p(e)(Y ￿ Xj) ￿ (1 ￿ p(e))cj ￿ ￿se (5)




Y + cj ￿ Xj
(6)










Proof. See the appendix
We can see that ~ e(Y;X;c) is increasing in c and decreasing in X. Rea-
sonably, if the borrower works harder, the probability of success increases
and the risk of default decreases. A higher repayment negatively a⁄ects the
borrower￿ s return in case of success, but not in the case of failure, thus re-
ducing incentives to apply more e⁄ort. On the other side, a higher amount
of collateral re￿ ects higher penalty in case of failure providing incentives to
put more e⁄ort.
Looking at the representative bank￿ s net pro￿t, we observe that:
￿ = p(e)Xj + (1 ￿ p(e))cj ￿ K = 0 (8)
In equilibrium due to competitive pressure the banks are constrained to
zero pro￿t on each observable class of borrower and therefore also on the
aggregate pool. The banks then maximize the borrower￿ s utility subject to
incentive compatibility curve (eq. 6). Given p00(e) < 0 and comparing (4) and
(6), we point out that ~ e < e￿. Equations (6) and (8) jointly determine the
amount of e⁄ort and consequently the probability of success into the project.
Moving along the incentive curve, the amount of repayment is decreasing. If
the borrowers put higher e⁄ort in the project, the risk of default is reduced
and the amount of repayment Xj must be lower to keep the net pro￿ts of
banks at the competitive level. As a consequence, a decrease in Xj raises the
incentive to work hard. Due to competitive market, the highest possible level
6of e⁄ort is generated even if this is less than the ￿rst-best case. This implies
that the source of the ine¢ ciency is due simply by the incentive distortion
in limited liability, i.e., no capital losses beyond the collateral posted.
We focus our attention on the behavior of the marginal borrower. For
any class of wealth, the marginal borrower is de￿ned as the individual who
is indi⁄erent to exit or remain active in the credit market. Due to the ￿rst
order stochastic dominance, we also know that the marginal borrower is the
individual with the highest aversion to e⁄ort for any class of wealth. Under
asymmetric information, this implies that her repayment Xj will be below
that of the full information case due to cross-subsidization. Therefore, as in
DeMeza and Webb (1987, 1999, 2000), for each observable class of borrowers
overlending occurs.
Remark 1: For any borrower￿ s￿class of wealth, the more averse to e⁄ort





(Y ￿ X + c)p00(~ e)
< 0 (9)
Remark 1 implies that individuals with a greater aversion to e⁄ort also
display a higher probability of default. Since the marginal individuals capture
the lowest share of project expected returns, their choice of e⁄ort is farthest
from the socially e¢ cient value showed above. However, in such framework,
credit rationing is impossible given that individuals with the highest aversion
to e⁄ort are the ￿rst to exit from the market as the interest rates rise. Further,
a representative borrower will undertake a project if and only if:
￿ U(~ e;￿;X) ￿ 0 (10)
From (10) a borrower enters into the credit market applying for funds if
and only if:
p(~ e) ￿
￿s~ e + cj
Y ￿ Xj + cj
(11)
Looking at the marginal case, from (11), there is a cut-o⁄ probability
of success below which loans are not asked by borrowers. Let us de￿ne
7this value with equality as pM(~ e), while the average probability of success
into the project is denoted as ￿ p(~ e), such that ￿ p(~ e) > pM(~ e). This implies
that ￿ p(~ e)Xj > pM(~ e)Xj where ￿ p(~ e)Xj can be denoted as the representative
bank￿ s average payment on each demand of K. Given that the utility from the
project of the marginal borrower is zero, the marginal borrower is indi⁄erent
to entry but gives rise to an expected loss of [￿ p(~ e) ￿ pM(~ e)]Xj to the bank.
We can state that:
Remark 2: The expected value of the marginal borrower￿ s project is
negative in equilibrium
Further, let us de￿ne the marginal set as the set of the marginal individ-
uals, one for each class of wealth, whose utilities are zero at the equilibrium
X and c. De￿ne the aversion to e⁄ort parameter along the marginal set as
the marginal aversion to e⁄ort. It is a function of the equilibrium collateral
c and repayment X for each class s. Then, di⁄erentiating the utility function
of the marginal borrower (hence with the maximum value function of utility










￿2p0(~ e)(Y ￿ X + c) + ~ e
> 0 (12)
Proof. See the Appendix
Formula (12) shows that along the marginal set, a higher wealth is ac-
companied by higher aversion to e⁄ort, i.e., richer marginal individuals are
more averse to e⁄ort in the project. The intuition for the result is that in a
context of hidden information, individuals are evaluated just on the basis of
their collateral independently by the aversion to e⁄ort they have. Moreover
richer individuals receive loans at lower interest rate and, as a consequence,
spend more e⁄ort other things equal. This implies that for a richer class of
borrowers, cross-subsidization is wider than in other classes.
3 Inequality of opportunity
In the previous section, we have showed that as in Bester (1985) and De Meza
and Webb (1987), an increase in the amount of wealth has only positive
8e⁄ects for both borrower￿ s utility and lender￿ s pro￿t function. No other
e⁄ect is taken into account. However, Stiglitz and Weiss (1992) show that
an increase in the amount of collateral may have quite di⁄erent impacts
with respect to Bester￿ s environment. Under certain conditions, notably
decreasing risk aversion, richer borrowers are those who are more willing
to undertake riskier projects2. As a consequence the representative bank
may be forced to increase the interest rate in response to an increase in
wealth. It follows that an ex-post moral hazard question must be analyzed.
Higher interest rates a⁄ect individuals in two ways. On one side, there is a
reduction in the share of low-risk borrowers (negative selection e⁄ect), while,
on the other side, borrowers are motivated to use riskier techniques (positive
incentive e⁄ects).
Relative to Stiglitz and Weiss (1992), although we do not consider de-
creasing absolute risk aversion, our setting is complicated by the independent
role of the aversion to e⁄ort parameter. From the borrower￿ s point of view,
an increase in the repayment Xj brings forth a reduction in terms of util-
ity. From (12), we also know that an increase in the amount of collateral is
positively correlated to the aversion to e⁄ort in the marginal set. Moreover,
given that for each class of wealth, the marginal borrower has the highest
aversion to e⁄ort, the higher the class of wealth, the higher the aversion to
e⁄ort accompanied to it. Now, additional information about the link between
the marginal aversion aversion to e⁄ort and the amount of repayment can be
developed.
Remark 3: In the marginal set, other things being equal, the lower the










￿2p0(~ e)(Y ￿ X + c) + ~ e
< 0 (13)
Proof. See the Appendix
Expression (13) implies that, as expected, the individuals with the highest
aversion to e⁄ort in the marginal set (i.e. the richest) are those who pay
2They study the case where individuals have the same opportunity sets with decreasing
absolute risk aversion. Instead, Wette (1983) shows that in the dynamic of incentive e⁄ects
no assumption of risk aversion is required if opportunity sets di⁄er across borrowers.
9the lowest interest rate. This is a logical consequence of eq. (12) as richer
borrowers, posting more collateral, receive a contract with a lower repayment.
In a context of perfect information, individuals with a higher aversion to
e⁄ort do not receive credit, independently by the class of wealth they belong.
Instead, with asymmetric information, in equilibrium, there are pooling inter-
est rates for each wealth class, such that richer individuals with high aversion
to e⁄ort may stay in the market. Since interest rates are higher for poorer
individuals, selection among poorer individuals is more severe due to a lower
cross-subsidization.
Such pooling equilibria perfectly characterize a violation of the equality of
opportunity principle. Aversion to e⁄ort being equal, richer individuals with
higher wealth receive a loan, while poorer individuals with a lower amount
of wealth may drop out of the market. This occurs due to two reasons.
On one side, the richer individuals post more collateral, are charged lower
interest rates and for both reasons exert more e⁄ort other things equal. On
the other side, more cross subsidization occurs in the richer class (because of
the reason above) and therefore more negative-surplus projects are realized
in this class than in the others. For both these reasons, the aversion to e⁄ort
of the marginal borrower in a rich class is bound to be larger than in lower
wealth classes.
However, that is not all. We can go further in our analysis. An increase in
the level of wealth of richer types induces a decrease in the interest rate, more
entry of even more e⁄ort adverse rich types and more cross subsidization.
Proposition 1: In the marginal set, due to incentive e⁄ect, an increase
in the wealth of borrowers leads to the entry of individuals with higher aver-
sion to e⁄ort.
Proof. Bester (1985) and De Meza and Webb (1987) show that an increase
in the wealth of a borrower brings to a reduction in the amount of repayment
required. Cross-subsidization is reduced pushing worse entrepreneurs out of
the market. Here, instead, due to the presence of incentive e⁄ects (SW,
1992), an increase in collateral implies more e⁄ort into the project from
participating borrowers and a reduction of the repayment such that some
marginal borrowers can enter. Entry has a countervailing (negative) e⁄ect
on the repayment but the incentive e⁄ect necessarily prevails- as entry is only
triggered by lower interest rates.
10To sum up, there is discrimination among classes of wealth. An increase
in inequality in the form of a higher wealth for rich classes implies a lower
repayment that in turn causes richer individuals with higher aversion to e⁄ort
to enter into the market further discriminating low-wealth individuals with
a lower aversion to e⁄ort.
4 Ine¢ ciency due to incentive e⁄ect
The analysis of the marginal borrower focuses on the individuals￿choice to
enter or not in the credit market. It is useful in our context because it allows
the analysis of the conditions under which the marginal poor individuals￿ef-
fort level is higher than the marginal rich individuals￿one. The combination
of personal wealth and individual aversion to e⁄ort assumes a crucial role in
determining who becomes a borrower. As demonstrated above, due to more
collateral, lower interest rates and more cross subsidization, richer individ-
uals characterized by high aversion to e⁄ort may decide to enter into the
credit market a⁄ecting the composition of the bank￿ s lending portfolio. An
e¢ ciency question must then be faced. Competition will force the banks to
o⁄er pooled-contracts dependent on collateral yielding zero expected pro￿t in
each wealth class. To make the problem manageable we added the hypothesis
that the lowest aversion to e⁄ort in each class is 0. This entails necessarily
that the best borrower in the class never defaults. We can express the pro￿t
function in terms of probability distributions as follows:
Bank￿ s pro￿t ￿ =
1 Z
pM(~ e)
[p(~ e)Xj + (1 ￿ p(~ e))cj ￿ K]dp(~ e) = 0 (14)
where pM(~ e) is de￿ned as the probability of success into the project of
the marginal borrower for any class of wealth cj. Given the choice about
participation in the credit market, the marginal borrower￿ s utility must be
zero:
Marginal borrower￿ s utility Ui = p(~ e)(Y ￿ Xj + cj) ￿ cj ￿ ￿s~ e = 0 (15)
11Combining conditions (14)-(15) and the standard optimal choice of e⁄ort
(6), a study about the possible behaviour of the marginal borrower for any
wealth level cj in the marginal set can be developed. Therefore, starting by
the bank￿ s net return function (14), we can derive the probability of success
of the marginal borrower pM(~ e) in terms of monetary measures as:
pM(~ e) =
2K ￿ cj ￿ Xj
Xj ￿ cj
(16)
Proof. See the Appendix
Formula (16) provides a clear link between the choice to remain active
in the market and the amount of collateral owned by each individual. It￿ s a
function of the capital K required for the realization of the project and the
class of wealth cj which the individuals belong to. Substituting (16) into the
utility function of a borrower (15), we can write that:
Ui =
￿
2K ￿ cj ￿ Xj
Xj ￿ cj
￿
(Y ￿ Xj + cj) ￿ cj ￿ ￿s~ e = 0 (17)
In particular, from e⁄ort choice (6):
Ui =
￿
2K ￿ cj ￿ Xj
Xj ￿ cj
￿
(Y ￿ Xj + cj) ￿ cj ￿ p
0(~ e)(Y ￿ Xj + cj)~ e = 0 (18)
Further, a negative correlation between collateral and e⁄ort can be de-
rived. It follows that:
Proposition 2: Due to incentive e⁄ects, the richer the marginal bor-

















+ (Y ￿ X + c)
< 0 (19)
12Proof. See the Appendix
The fact that, in the marginal set, e⁄ort actually spent is negatively cor-
related with collateral has far reaching consequences. Indeed, it means that
marginal richer individuals not only are more averse to e⁄ort, causing a vi-
olation of equality of opportunity, but also exert less e⁄ort than marginal
poorer individuals. The traditional literature about the credit market sug-
gests that an increase in the amount of collateral brings forth an increase in
the amount of e⁄ort for all classes of borrowers. Here, instead, we show that
in the marginal set, the e⁄ort levels of richer individuals are lower than those
of the poorer ones. An ine¢ ciency question due to the wrong allocation of
credit arises. Although more wealth motivates better individual participat-
ing in the credit market before and after the increase in wealth, entry of some
new types occurs as well. The entrants are certainly characterized by higher
aversion to e⁄ort. However our last result suggests also that in equilibrium
they actually exert a lower e⁄ort. Hence while for the infra marginal indi-
viduals more wealth can only imply more e⁄ort, the entry of new marginal
participant worsens the pool and may decrease average e⁄ort spent in each
class.
Some interesting consequences follow.
Credit allocation is not only unequal but also ine¢ cient. Particularly,
in our model, two sources of ine¢ ciency are now revealed. The ￿rst tradi-
tional ine¢ ciency belongs to the overlending phenomenon class due to cross-
subsidization as in De Meza and Webb (1987). More interestingly the second
source of ine¢ ciency is derived from a wrong credit allocation among classes
of wealth i.e. individuals who receive funds from the bank may also be those
who put less e⁄ort into the realization of the project. In the second sense,
inequality and ine¢ ciency are clearly intertwined. The two problems can
be addressed jointly through a government action aimed at changing the
composition of loans rather than the overall amount of credit. Since richer
individuals exert less e⁄ort (in the margin) a redistributive policy towards
poorer ones might increase the surplus in the system.
135 Conclusion
We have explored the relationship between equality of opportunity and e¢ -
ciency in the credit market. Building on leading models of asymmetric in-
formation (both ex-ante and ex-post) in the credit market, our model allows
for heterogeneity of would-be entrepreneurs both in wealth and preferences
over e⁄ort aversion. Equality of opportunity is evaluated relative to e⁄ort
aversion, which is obviously also the unobservable variable. The wealth of
di⁄erent individuals, on the contrary, is observable and entirely posted as
collateral.
In this context we ￿nd two important results. On one side we demon-
strate that, due to e⁄ects linked to collateral both direct and indirect (notably
greater e⁄ort and cross subsidization), richer individuals participate more in
the credit market even when relatively more averse to e⁄ort. This is charac-
terized as a violation of the equality of opportunity principle. An important
caveat in this result is that more participation for the richer results also from
more e⁄ort due to the own participation in the project and the consequent
lower interest rates, which by themselves mitigate the moral hazard problem.
However we also ￿nd that marginal richer borrowers exert less e⁄ort than
poorer ones in equilibrium, notwithstanding these counterbalancing e⁄ects.
This result has far reaching consequences for public policies. In particular
it strongly suggests that the allocation of credit can be made more e¢ cient
by transferring resources form richer to poorer borrowers. More in general it
suggests that public programs are more likely to produce results if targeted at
lower wealth individuals. This is at odds with some evidence about the way
existing public policies are devised and implemented particularly in Italy.
On the contrary it is coherent with the growing interest for programs of
micro-credit in poor countries.
An interesting joint consequence of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 is
that an increasing inequality determines entry in the high wealth segment
of the credit market and exit from the low wealth segment. In our setting
this implies a lower aggregate surplus, as marginal richer borrowers spend
less e⁄ort than marginal poor borrowers. More in general we think that the
link between inequality dynamics and credit market performance is the most




From (6), straightforward comparative statics are given by:
p
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p00(~ e)(Y + c ￿ X)
< 0
15B) Proof of eq. (12)
We start by the utility function for the marginal borrower i (1) for each
class of wealth j and by the FOC suggested in (6) which are respectively
given by:




Y ￿ Xj + cj
(21)
From (20) , the condition of the marginal borrower i for each class of
wealth j implies that:
(Y ￿ Xj + cj) =
cj + ￿s~ e
p(~ e)
(22)
Substituting (22) into (21), it follows that:
p(~ e) =




It refers to the probability of success of the marginal borrower. Therefore,
the utility function of the marginal borrower i at any class of collateral j can
be expressed as:
Ui =
cj + ￿s~ e
￿s
p
0(~ e)(Y ￿ Xj + cj) ￿ cj ￿ ￿s~ e (24)
Looking at (24), we can di⁄erentiate the utility function Ui with respect
to c;￿;X. Hence, we can establish by envelope theorem that in computing
the ￿rst-order e⁄ects respectively of changes in c,￿,X on the maximum value
of the utility function Ui the only e⁄ect of any consequences is the direct
e⁄ect. The terms in each of the three equations respectively d~ e=dc, d~ e=d￿
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= 0 by (6) for each class of wealth j. The
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0(~ e)(Y ￿ X + c) ￿ ~ e < 0 (27)
3) Finally, based on the de￿nition of the marginal set, we obtain that eq.
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C) Proof of eq. (13):
Following the analysis proposed on point B for eq. (12) on the basis of










￿2p0(~ e)(Y ￿ X + c) + ~ e
< 0
A.3 Ine¢ ciency due to incentive e⁄ect
D) Proof of eq. (16)
































(1 + pM(~ e))(1 ￿ pM(~ e)) + (cj ￿ K)(1 ￿ pM(~ e)) = 0
Therefore, it follows that the probability of success of the marginal bor-
rower in terms of monetary measures is equal to:
pM(~ e) =
2K ￿ cj ￿ Xj
Xj ￿ cj
E) Proof of eq. (19)
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2KY ￿ 2KXj + 2Kcj ￿ XjY + X2
j ￿ Xjcj ￿ cjY
Xj ￿ cj
￿
￿(Y ￿Xj+cj)~ e = 0
(30)
The e⁄ect of varying the level of collateral with respect to the utility
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￿ ~ e < 0 (31)
which is negative given that Xj = (1 + rj)K. As regards, instead, the
















￿(2K ￿ X)(X ￿ c) + Y (X ￿ K) ￿ Y (K + c)
(X ￿ c)
￿





￿(2K ￿ X)(Y + X ￿ c) ￿ cY
(X ￿ c)
￿
￿ (Y ￿ X + c) < 0 (32)
Summing up the ￿rst derivatives of the utility function with respect to


















+ (Y ￿ X + c)
< 0
which is de￿nitively negative.
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